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ABSTRACT 
 
Online auctions create reputation mechanisms to give users information about the 
reputation of their trading partners.  This information helps the buyer to make an 
informed decision regarding his purchase: whether or not to make a purchase from a 
particular seller and the price the buyer is willing to pay.  eBay is a leading internet 
auctioneers and in May 2008, it changed its feedback system. This paper examines the 
new feedback system and studies the impact of seller’s reputation on auction’s price. The 
empirical results show that buyers respond to the Positive Feedback ratings of sellers. 
However, the impact on the price is small.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Traditional markets depend on the trust that is built up through the interaction 
between buyers and sellers (Cabral and Hortacsu, 2005). On the other hand in online 
markets, buyers and sellers engage in transactions without any previous history of trust.  
Since the buyer cannot test the item, he relies on the seller’s description and reliability to 
deliver the item.  These issues make the online auction risky (Melnail &Alm, 2002). 
Online auctions have developed an alternative option to the concept of traditional 
reputation by creating a feedback system. Through this system, reputation can be 
established and information about it is made available to others.  The system collects 
information about all transactions of a seller that have happened in the past. This 
information is available for a prospective buyer who can base his decision to buy or not 
from this seller based on this information (Cabral & Hortacsu, 2005).  
In 1995 eBay was launched as an online auction. Today with millions of items 
available on eBay, it has become one of the largest internet auctions.  The eBay 
reputation system allows buyers and sellers to rate each other after each transaction. The 
system keeps records of all feedback left by previous trading partners. Access to this 
information is available to all participants in the marketplace. That makes eBay a rich 
environment to study the effects of seller’s reputation on the auction’s selling prices.  
 Since buyers in online auctions are not able to test and see the item, they depend 
on information that they get from sellers about their items. The reputation of the seller is 
the only available source to buyers about the honesty of the seller. Sellers in most cases 
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do not ship the items until they receive payment. This paper examines the effects of the 
seller’s reputation on the price of the seller’s good. Statistical data were derived from the 
eBay website about the feedback history of sellers and the prices of the goods. About 490 
auctions of iPhone 3G were investigated to find how the feedback from previous 
transactions would affect future transactions. 
Several economists have studied the effects of seller’s reputation on auctions’ 
selling prices. Melnik and Alm (2002) used data from auctions of 1999 mint condition $5 
U.S gold coin. The average price of these items was $ 32.73. The results showed that the 
buyer is willing to pay more to sellers with higher reputation. However, the impact on the 
price was very minor. Houser and Wooders (2005) examined the effect of reputation on 
prices of Intel Pentium III 500 Mhz auctions on eBay. They found that bidder reputation 
has no effect. While seller reputation matters, it is not significant.  
In May 2008, eBay changed its feedback system. This paper investigates the new 
feedback system and studies the impact of seller reputation on buyer behavior. To the 
best of my knowledge, there are no previous paper studies of the new eBay reputation 
system. I have found that the percentage of positive feedback has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the price of the seller’s good. 
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 explains how eBay reputation 
mechanism works; section 3 describes my approach for estimating the impact of 
reputation; section 4 discusses the dataset; section 5 presents the main empirical results; 
and finally section 6 concludes the paper. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
AUCTIONS ON EBAY 
 
 
All the information about eBay in this section comes from the eBay website. In 
order to buy or sell on eBay, a person needs to register first by providing some personal 
information such as name, address and an email account.  eBay uses this information to 
verify a person’s identity. This reduces a person’s chance of restarting with a new record. 
However, it does not prevent it.  After the registration process is done, the person chooses 
an eBay’s identity. Other members on eBay are only able to see the member’s ID but not 
any other personal information. Finally a person receives an email message to confirm 
their email address (Grund & Gutler,2006) (eBay website).   
eBay’s income comes from charging sellers (Melnail &Alm, 2002). A seller can 
place an item on eBay for sale by creating an offer page.  On this page the seller 
describes the item, specifies a starting price, and explains the details of the sale, such as 
the method of payment and shipping cost.  It is the seller’s responsibility to ship the item. 
In addition, the seller chooses when the auction starts and the length of the auction. A 
seller may add more details on his offer page such as return policy, and they may post 
pictures, and so on  (eBay website), (Melnail &Alm, 2002), (Grund & Gutler,2006), 
(Lucking-Reiley et al, 2006).  
Subsequent to each transaction, both the buyer and the seller are able to leave 
feedback for each other. After May 2008, the buyer can rate the seller as a +1 (positive), a 
-1 (negative), or a 0 (neutral) rating, along with a short comment. On the other hand, the 
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seller can leave only a +1(positive) and a one line text comment (Cabral & Hortacsu, 
2005), (Grund & Gutler, 2006), (Lucking-Reiley et al, 2006), (eBay website). 
eBay measures the reputation of the user in two ways; the percentage of positive 
feedback ratings1 and  the feedback score, and the difference between the number of 
positive feedbacks and negative feedbacks2. The user’s profile contains all feedback 
points and comments that are left by other partners with whom the user has had previous 
transactions. The profile is available to public (Melnail &Alm, 2002), (Cabral & 
Hortacsu, 2005), (Resnick et al,  2005), (eBay website)  
On the top of the auction page, the feedback score and the percentage of positive 
feedback ratings are automatically displayed next to the seller’s ID. By clicking on the 
feedback score, a bidder can access the seller’s feedback profile, where more information 
is available about the seller’s reputation as well as comments that the seller has received 
from other members in the past (eBay website). 
From February to May 2008 eBay was changing its feedback policies. According 
to eBay, the previous feedback system did not prevent sellers from retaliating against 
negative feedback from buyers (eBay website).” Today, the biggest issue with the system 
is that buyers are more afraid than ever to leave honest, accurate feedback because of the 
threat of retaliation. In fact, when buyers have a bad experience on eBay, the final straw 
                                                          
1
“Positive Feedback ratings: The percentage of positive ratings left by members in the 
last 12 months. This is calculated by dividing the number of positive ratings by the total 
number of ratings (positive + negative)” (eBay website).  
2
 “. “It’s the number in parentheses next to a member’s user ID and is also located at the 
top of the Feedback Profile. Feedback score = positive + neutral + negative” (eBay 
website) 
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for many of them is getting a negative feedback, especially of a retaliatory nature" (Bill 
Cobb, president of eBay North America).  
The main changes in eBay’s feedback system are as follows. Since February 
2008, sellers and buyers are allowed to earn one feedback point regardless of the number 
of transactions between the same trading partners. If a seller has more than one 
transaction in the same week with the same buyer, then the seller can get only one 
feedback point from the buyer. The feedback score of seller would increase by one if the 
seller gets more positive feedback points than negative points. It would decrease by one if 
he gets more negative feedback points than positive ones. And it would be the same if the 
number of positives is equal to the number of negatives ones, while the buyer’s feedback 
score would increase only by one point (eBay website). 
Since May 2008, only buyers are allowed to leave positive, negative or neutral 
feedback for sellers, while sellers are only allowed to leave positive feedback. According 
to eBay, this rule would encourage buyers to leave honest feedback without fear from 
retaliation from sellers. eBay believes that this makes the feedback system more accurate, 
(eBay website). 
Only the feedback points that are earned in the last 12 months are used to 
calculate the positive feedback percentage ratings.  According to eBay, a seller’s recent 
feedback gives a clearer idea about seller’s trends and patterns (eBaywebsite). 
In the new feedback system, if a member does not pay fees or has violated eBay 
policies, the system would suspend the member’s account. In such case all negative and 
neutral feedback left by that member would be removed (eBay website). 
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However, the new system does not allow sellers to leave a negative or neutral 
feedback about buyers. Sellers are still allowed to report any violation of a buyer. Also 
the system gives the right to sellers to prevent buyers who have violated eBay’s policies 
from bidding or buying items. (eBay website) 
There is no change in the feedback score. eBay still uses the same method to 
calculate the score (all positive feedback points that a member earns in a lifetime minus 
the negative feedback points that are earned by member in lifetime).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
 
The bidding amount reflects the consumer’s willingness to pay and hence our 
focus will be on factors that influence the consumer’s willingness to pay. Thus, primary 
interest of the paper is to examine the impact of a seller’s reputation on the bidding 
amount as reputation affects the buyer’s willingness to pay. However, there are other 
factors that may affect the willingness to bid besides reputation. Willingness to pay or 
bidding amount is primarily influenced by information about the seller, services and 
product. 
Feedback rating provides information on a seller’s behavior. As a result it 
generates a magnitude of trust in the mind of the bidder about the seller. Ultimately, the 
bidder reflects his/her satisfaction through the magnitude of the bid. Particularly, a higher 
feedback rating is expected to have a positive effect on the bidding amount. Reputation is 
measured on eBay in two ways; feedback score (positive feedback points minus negative 
feedback points), and positive feedback rating (the percentage of positive feedback 
ratings of the last 12 months).   
In this study I use the positive feedback rating as an independent variable. I 
expect, that a positive feedback rating (PFR) has a positive influence on the auction price.  
The number of bids (Nbid) is the number of prospective buyers who are aware of 
the auction, who are able to bid, and who have a value for the item. By using the number 
of bids I have omitted two other variables (the length of the auction and the time of the 
auction) since the number of bids reflect the demand for the seller’s item. The seller’s 
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skills like web design, photography and verbal descriptions are reflected in the number of 
bids for his items. I expect the coefficient on the number of bids to be positive.  
The shipping cost (Scost) is included. It is the amount of money that the sellers 
charges to the buyer for shipping an item to him. It is not included with the price of the 
item. The rational bidder in general considers the total price that he is going to pay.  As 
the seller charges a higher price for shipping, that will decrease the price that the buyer is 
willing to pay. I expect the shipping cost has a negative effect on the auction price.   
Unlocking of the phones (Unlocked) is another important variable that affects the 
price of the iPhone. Unlocked phones are not tied to a particular service provider, thus the 
user can switch from one cellular network to another.  Bidders are willing to pay more for 
unlocked phones. Unlocked is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the iPhone is 
not locked and zero if it is locked. 
 Buyers are willing to pay more for a new item than a used one. Thus I include a 
dummy variable (New) which is equal to one if the iPhone is new and never been used 
otherwise it is equal to zero.  
My hypothesis is that buyers are willing to pay more to a seller with a high 
feedback than a seller without a strong reputation. In my initial modeling efforts, I tried 
to find the linear relationship between the winning bid (P), and the reputation variable 
Positive Feedback rating (PFR) for the seller.  
The following model is used to show the above mention relationship,  
      	  
              (1) 
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The following variables are included in this model: PFR is the positive feedback 
rating for the seller, Nbid is the number of bids by sellers, Scost is the shipping cost in 
US dollars, Ulocked is a dummy variable equals to one if the iPhone is not locked, and 
the dummy variable New, which is equal to one if the iPhone has never been used. Table 
1 shows the expectation signs  
 
Table 1: Comparative Statics 
  Sign 
1 
∂ p
∂FBD
 + 
2 
∂ p
∂ PFR
 + 
3 
∂ p
∂ Nbid
 + 
4 
∂ p
∂ Scost
 - 
 
It might be possible that the willingness to pay a higher price in response to better 
feedback will diminish as the reputation increases to 100%. The sellers who belong to the 
upper quintile of the feedback distribution are close to each other in terms of the quality 
of service. But those sellers who belong to the lower or middle quintiles are not so 
trustworthy. Thus, an equal amount of change in the magnitude of reputation is expected 
to have a different impact on the bidding price for a different range of the magnitude of 
the reputation. Therefore, to take care of such differential impact of reputation, I consider 
natural log of reputation as a key explanatory variable.  
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Since some sellers have zero feedback, I took the natural log of the value of 
reputation plus one. Other variables are entered in a linear form. Figure 1 shows the 
feature of the nonlinear relationship between bidding amount and feedback percentage. 
Figure 2 represents the feature of the data in the same dimension.  
 
     +,-	.  
             (2) 
 
 
Figure1: winning bid-Positive feedback rating 
 
 
Figure2: the feature of the data.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
 
I have used identical items (iPhones) from different sellers that allowed me 
eliminate the effect of differences between items on price and test the value of reputation 
of seller. The problem of using identical items is finding enough observations, as there 
are not always many sellers who sell the same items on eBay. I collected the data over a 
short period of time in order to eliminate any change in the behavior of buyers. In order 
to have enough observations I chose iPhone because it is one of the most popular items 
being sold on eBay.   
I manually collected data on auctions from eBay’s website. However, I am 
focusing on items that are being sold only to customers in the U.S. I collected transaction 
level information on the Apple iPhones. The data was collected between October 28, 
2008 and November 12, 2008.  The price of iPhone 3G ranged from $200 to $785. The 
feedback ratings for a seller is updated automatically; therefore I collected the data at the 
end of the auctions.  
On the offer page, the seller describes the item and adds other information about 
the transaction like shipping cost, transit time, places where he would ship his items, 
minimum bid, and sometimes add picture(s) of the item. eBay automatically  provides  
information about the seller on his offer page such as seller’s ID, feedback score 
(different between positive and negative feedback), percentage of positive ratings, and if 
the seller accept PayPal as a method of payment or not . Figure 3 shows an example of a 
seller’s offer page. 
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Figure 3: seller’s offer page. 
 
 
13 
 
 
The dataset contains the seller’s ID, feedback score, percentage of positive 
feedback, winning bid in US dollar, the shipping cost in US dollar, number of bids, the 
date of posting of the auction on eBay, payment method, places where he would ship his 
items, if the seller accepts PayPal or not, whether the item is new or used and whether the 
item is locked or unlocked. Appendix-B shows the dataset that was used in this paper.   
Table 2 shows the summary statistic for all variables.  
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Positive Feedback 
ratings  
(PFR) 
490 94.63102 20.49742 0 100 
Winning bid  
(P) 
490 422.0923 187.2977 0 785 
Number of bids  
(Nbid) 
490 19.09388 17.45914 0 65 
Shipping cost 
(Scost) 
490 7.495286 9.423275 0 101.99 
New 490 0.3877551 0.4877 0 1 
Unlocked 490 0.544894 0.498489 0 1 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
In this section, I present my main empirical findings. It is divided into three 
subsections. The first section deals with the linear specification of my model, and second 
section describes the nonlinear specification. The last section I added more specifications.  
Linear regression   
I tried to find a linear relationship between winning bid (P) and the Positive 
Feedback rating (PFR). In the first model I have included the independent variable 
Positive Feedback rating and the dummy variable (New). In the following model I 
included other variables. Table 3 below displays the linear regression results on the 
determinants of prices in the eBay Apple iPhone 3G auctions in my sample. 
Column one represents the results for a linear regression which contains the 
Positive Feedback rating as an independent variable and the dummy variable (New) 
which indicate whether an item is new or used. The coefficient estimate for Positive 
Feedback rating has the expected sign and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. As 
the Positive Feedback rating increases by one percentage point, the winning bid increases 
by $0.823.  The dummy variable (New) has a positive sign, and it is also statistically 
significant at about the 5% level.  The winning bid for a new item is $ 61.79 higher than a 
winning bid for a used item. The R-squared is low (0.0332), only 3.32% of variability in 
the winning bid is reduced by knowing the independent variables.  
Second column introduces other (extra) variables that may affect the winning bid 
of the auction besides Positive Feedback rating. These variables include number of bids, 
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shipping cost, and the dummy variable Unlocked. The dummy variable (New) is also 
included. The coefficient estimated for Positive Feedback rating has the expected sign, 
and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. As the Positive Feedback rating increases 
by one percentage point, the winning bid increases by $1.166.  
 
Table 3: Linear regression results 
Full Sample, 490 obs. 
Model Number  1 2 
Positive Feedback 
Ratings (PFR) 
.823275* 1.16568* 
(0.049) (0.002) 
Number of bids  
(Nbid) 
___    4.30859* 
  (0.000) 
Shipping cost 
(Scost) 
___   -2.41948* 
  (0.003) 
Unlocked 
___   51.04343* 
  (0.001) 
New 
61.79221*  60.3374* 
( 0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
Constant  
319.7344 195.9067 
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
R^2 0.0332   0.2218 
P-Values are in parenthesis. 
* Indicates significance at 5% level  
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Number of bid (Nbid) has a positive influence on the auction price. The 
coefficient on this variable is positive and it is significant. As the Nbid increases with 
increment in price.  As expected, the coefficient on shipping cost is negative and 
statistically siginficant. As shipping cost increase by one, the winning bid decreases by 
$2.40.    
The dummy variable (Unlocked) has a positive sign and it is statistically 
significant at about the 5% level.  Unlocked iPhone increases the willingness to pay by 
$51.04. If an item is new, it will increase the winning bid by $60.33. The dummy variable 
New has a positive sign and it is statistically significant at about the 5% level.  A new 
item is valued more highly by eBay users. The R-squared is higher in the 2nd specification 
(column 2). This second specificaiton explains 22% of the variation in the winning bid, 
while the first specificaiton explained only 3%.  
Nonlinear regression   
I studied a nonlinear relationship between the Positive Feedback rating and a 
winning bid. The independent variable (Log (PFR+1)) is a natural logarithm of the 
Positive Feedback rating plus one. The dummy variable New is included in all 
specifications. In the last specification, other variables were introduced with the Positive 
Feedback rating.  Table 4 presents results for nonlinear regression models on the sample 
data. In the following, I highlight my most important results.  
In the regression models, the coefficient estimate for a Positive Feedback rating 
has an expected sign in column one and two in table 4; it is statistically significant at the 
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5% level. 1% increase in positive feedback rateing (i.e. 80% to 80.8% ) will increase 
bidding amount by $0.1898 in column one and $0.2544 in column two. 1 
Number of bids is included in column two. As expected, the coefficient on 
number of bid is positive and statistically siginficant.  As the number of bids increases by 
one, the winning bid increases approximately by $4.03. The shipping cost  has a negative 
influence on the auction price. The coefficient on this variable is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. As the shipping cost decreases  by $1, the winning bid increases 
approximately by $2.30. The dummy variable (Unlocked) has a positive sign, and it is 
statistically significant at about the 5% level.  The dummy variable (New) has a positive 
sign, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level.  A new item is valued more highly 
by eBay users.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
      +,-	.  
            
/0
/12-345.
   6  
/0
7-89:.
89:
   6  ;   
/-345.
345
 6  ;   < 0.01  
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Table 4: Nonlinear regression results 
Full Sample, 490 obs. 
Model Number  3 4 
Log (PFR+1) 
18.98832* 25.44043* 
(0.038) (0.002) 
Number of bids  
(Nbid) 
___    4.29033* 
  (0.000) 
Shipping cost 
(Scost) 
___   -2.4069* 
  (0.003) 
Unlocked 
___   51.39629* 
  (0.001) 
New 
61.51969*  59.7912* 
( 0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
Constant  
314.0868 194.4149 
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
R^2 0.0340   0.2217 
P-Values are in parenthesis. 
* Indicates significance at 5% level  
 
Additional specifications  
In this section I tried different type of regressions.  I tried to find the relationship 
between the Positive Feedback rating and a winning bid. In table 5, the dependent 
variable Log (P+1) is natural logarithm of winning bid plus one and the independent 
variable Log (PFR+1) is a natural logarithm of the positive feedback rating plus one. 
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Column one represents the results for a nonlinear regression which contains the 
Log(PFR+1). The coefficient estimate for Positive Feedback rating has the expected sign 
and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. Elasticity of bidding amount with 
respond to Positive Feedback Rating is 0.22. This implies if the Positive Feedback rating 
increases by 1%, the winning bid increases by 0.22%.  
 
Table 5: Additional specification  
Full Sample, 490 obs. 
Independent Variables 5 6 7 
Log (PFR+1) 
0.2210227* 0.2921807* 0.2562166* 
(0.039) (0.003) (0.002) 
Number of bids  ___   0.0527014* ___   
(Nbid) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Log Number of bids ___   ___   0.956154* 
Log(Nbid+1) 
  
(0.000) 
Shipping cost ___   -0.0175325 -0.018815* 
(Scost) 
 
(0.063) (0.021) 
Unlocked 
___   0.3078909 0.3348158* 
 
(0.093) (0.034) 
New 
___   0.0828989 0.1621252 
 
(0.658) (0.316) 
Constant  
4.334644 2.945479 1.864924 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R^2 0.0087 0.1983 0.402 
P-Values are in parenthesis. 
* Indicates significance at 5% level  
 
20 
 
The second column introduces other (extra) variables that may affect the winning 
bid of the auction besides Positive Feedback rating. These variables include number of 
bids, shipping cost, the dummy variable Unlocked and the dummy variable (New). The 
coefficient estimated for Positive Feedback rating has the expected sign, and it is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. As the Positive Feedback rating increases by 1% 
the winning bid increases by 0.29%. The other variables; shipping cost, Unlocked, and 
New are not statistically significant at the 5% level.  
In column three, I took the natural logarithm of the number of bids plus one 
Log(Nbid+1). Other depend variables are entered in same form in column two. The 
coefficient estimate for a Positive Feedback rating has an expected sign and it is 
statistically significant at the 5%  level. Elasticity of bidding amount with respond to 
Positive Feedback Rating is 0.25. This implies if the Positive Feedback rating increases 
by 1%, the winning bid increases by 0.25%.  
Number of bids has a positive influence on the auction price. The coefficient on 
this variable is positive and it is significant. Shipping cost has negative effect on the 
winning price. The dummy variable (Unlocked) has a positive sign and it is statistically 
significant at about the 5% level. The dummy variable is New is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  The R-squared is 0.4, only 40% of variability in the winning 
bid is reduced by knowing the independent variables. R-square is 
higher than the last two specifications. 
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Interestingly, the reputation of sellers in the new feedback system has an impact on 
bidders on eBay. In fact buyers do respond to the Positive Feedback ratings. However the 
impact of the seller’s reputation on the auction’s price is small.  
In a previous study (March 2008), I used data from eBay about 129 online auctions of 
Windows XP home edition. The results show that the seller’s reputation has no impact on 
auction price [Appendix-A]. There are two reasons that might have caused this result. 
First, the sample size of is 129 observations, which is considered to be small. It was very 
difficult to find enough observations for an identical item from different sellers over a 
short period of time for that item. The other reason is that until March 2008 the new 
system was not fully functional.     
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Online auctions depend on a feedback system in order to give users more 
information about their trading partners’ reputation.  This paper has estimated the effect 
of the seller’s reputation on the buyer’s willingness to bid.  In this study, I used data from 
eBay about 490 online auctions of Apple iPhone 3G (one of the most popular items on 
eBay) in November 2008.   
This paper is distinct from others in studying the effect of the seller’s reputation 
after eBay changed the feedback system. According to eBay, buyers did not leave honest 
feedback about seller because they were afraid that sellers would retaliate against them. 
Thus eBay changed its feedback system from February to May 2008. In the new system, 
sellers are no longer allowed to leave negative or neutral feedback, and positive feedback 
percentage is calculated based on the last twelve months of feedback, members are able 
to earn one feedback point per week from the same trading partners.  
The results indicate that eBay buyers react significantly to the percentage of 
positive feedback. In addition, the study on the effect of other variables on the auction 
price shows that the number of bids and shipping cost do have a measurable effect on the 
auction price.  
eBay is a rich environment to study online auctions. With such a source of data, 
there is a lot of work that can be done in the future; for example besides using the 
positive feedback rating as a measure of reputation, one could use variables that represent 
the seller’s reputation.   
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“Detailed Seller Rankings” (DSR) is another concept that eBay uses in the 
feedback system. Buyers are able to rate sellers on four areas:  accuracy of the item 
description, communications, shipping time, and shipping and handling charges. In each 
one of these four dimensions, buyers can rate seller from 1-5, (eBay website). For future 
work DSR could be used to test how buyers react to sellers’ DSR.   
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Appendices  
A-Results from previous study  
 
Table A.1: Linear regression results 
Full Sample, 129 obs. 
Model Number  1 2 3 4 5 
Positive Feedback 
(Pfb) 
.001866   ___  .0005927  ___   -.0027167  
(0.371)   (0.749 )   ( 0.313) 
Negative Feedback 
(Nfb) 
___ 
  
.4089057   ___  .4723027 .8406628  
( 0.293 )   ( 0.167) ( 0.094) 
Number of bid (Nbid) 
___  ___    1.278308   1.308225  1.370605  
    (0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
Time (t) 
___   ___   .2072516   .0597209  -.0200941 
    ( 0.879) (0.965) (0.988 ) 
Shipping cost (Scost) 
 ___  ___   -1.208414 -1.218924 -1.210247 
    ( 0.031 ) ( 0.028 ) (0.030 ) 
Starting Bid (Sbid) 
 ___  ___    .039904   .04543  .054865  
    ( 0.666 ) (0.620) ( 0.551) 
New 
21.55266  21.85065  23.90555   24.526  24.61739 
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) 
Constant  
60.33125  60.12614  46.83549  46.13775    45.73628  
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
R^2 0.1803 0.1823  0.3855  0.3946 0.3997 
Note: the number between prentices is the P-value 
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Table A.2: Nonlinear regression results 
Full Sample, 129 obs. 
Model Number  1 2 3 4 5 
Log (Pos +1) (lpfb1) 
1.742454  ___   .7855486 ___      .3008735 
( 0.094)   (0.406 )   (0.814) 
Log (Neg +1) (lnfb1) 
___    2.367643 ___     2.074669 1.620722  
  (0.325)   ( 0.329 ) (0.573 ) 
Number of bid (Nbid) 
 ___    ___   
  
1.252331 1.291862 1.277261  
    ( 0.000) (0.000 ) (0.000) 
Time (t) 
 ___    ___    .2007231   .1436664  .1535568  
    (0.882 ) (0.916 ) (0.910 ) 
Shipping cost (Scost) 
___    ___    -1.244695  -1.225312  -1.23624 
    ( 0.027) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028) 
Starting Bid (Sbid) 
___     ___   .0412679   .0458068  .0448164 
    (0.654) (0.619 ) ( 0.628 ) 
New 
21.10151 21.4935 23.54639   23.92286   23.79846  
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000) ( 0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
Constant  
53.94614  59.88423  44.55291 46.09286   45.37494 
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000) ( 0.000 ) (0.000) 
R^2 0.1933 0.1814 0.3885 0.3898 0.3901 
Note: the number between prentices is the P-value 
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B-Empirical data from eBay website 
 
 
Table B.1 Empirical data 
New Unlocked 
Feedback 
Score 
Positive feedback 
rating 
Winning bid 
Number of 
bid 
Shipping cost 
1 0 66 100 560.00 30 0 
0 1 759 98.9 449.44 19 0 
1 1 54 97.1 485.00 14 0 
1 1 148 100 495.00 4 0 
0 1 85 100 481.00 38 25 
0 1 648 98.8 485.00 10 0 
1 1 1046 100 644.99 1 0 
0 1 1 100 0.00 0 10 
0 1 1 100 0.00 0 10 
0 0 12 100 285.00 11 10 
1 0 172 100 0.00 0 0 
0 0 26 100 411.00 9 10 
0 0 3367 99.5 0.00 18 0 
1 1 161 100 570.00 20 0 
1 1 3277 99.9 529.99 1 19.99 
0 0 2 100 471.00 36 8.25 
1 1 64 100 0.00 0 0 
1 1 1460 98.8 0.00 0 19.95 
0 1 395 97.7 495.00 42 0 
0 1 86 97.1 515.87 54 25 
1 1 3277 99.9 589.99 1 19.99 
1 1 3277 99.9 0.00 0 19.99 
1 1 3277 99.9 0.00 0 19.99 
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1 0 476 100 550.00 32 0 
0 1 37 100 455.00 42 0 
1 1 29 100 475.00 20 15 
1 1 56 98.1 620.00 43 8.4 
1 1 2149 98.8 480.00 14 101.99 
0 0 32 100 415.00 47 0 
0 1 574 98.5 410.00 1 0 
0 0 3277 99.9 270.99 33 12.99 
0 0 1 100 445.99 35 10 
1 0 35 100 570.00 65 11 
0 0 791 99.4 0.00 0 8 
1 1 1634 100 540.00 47 0 
1 0 1447 99.5 595.00 32 0 
0 0 53 100 485.00 29 0 
0 1 462 100 480.00 29 14.99 
0 0 4645 99.3 306.00 13 5.75 
1 0 35 100 0.00 0 12 
1 0 112 100 540.00 21 17 
1 1 66 100 530.00 26 12.95 
0 0 4 100 425.00 8 0 
0 0 4 100 415.00 6 20.55 
1 1 121 100 0.00 0 13.6 
1 1 224 97.5 521.00 3 10 
1 1 140 93.8 590.00 31 15 
1 1 1691 100 550.00 53 0 
1 1 40 97.6 0.00 0 19 
1 1 18 100 521.00 13 18.65 
1 0 47 100 500.00 5 12 
1 0 17 100 572.00 23 0 
0 0 13 100 455.00 3 0 
0 0 17 50 590.00 51 0 
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1 1 43 100 510.00 56 20 
0 0 171 100 395.00 7 15.79 
1 1 0 0 510.00 9 15 
1 1 52 92.3 579.99 23 9.99 
1 0 111 99 0.00 0 6.95 
1 0 130 100 526.00 41 29.99 
1 0 130 100 530.02 31 29.99 
1 0 5 85.7 495.00 14 9.99 
0 1 752 99.9 514.00 3 15 
0 0 67 100 449.00 27 0 
0 1 508 98.8 465.00 6 12.99 
0 0 3 100 520.00 2 0 
1 1 11338 99.6 531.90 27 8.1 
0 1 45 100 425.00 19 10 
0 0 0 0 403.00 34 5 
1 1 40 97.6 599.00 1 19 
1 0 23 96 600.01 3 0 
0 1 73 91.7 520.00 2 0 
0 0 0 0 425.01 17 0 
0 1 5 100 405.00 28 0 
1 1 76 100 566.00 13 0 
0 0 0 0 485.00 45 0 
1 1 3 100 552.23 35 0 
0 0 117 100 338.00 33 10.1 
0 0 2 100 440.00 56 0 
1 0 16 100 475.00 53 16.98 
1 0 16 100 510.00 28 16.98 
1 0 16 100 465.00 35 16.98 
0 0 28 100 490.00 21 11 
0 0 31 94.7 700.00 2 20 
1 0 16 100 485.00 32 16.98 
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1 0 16 100 483.00 17 16.98 
0 1 51 100 500.00 34 26 
0 0 5 100 490.00 26 0 
1 1 10 100 561.00 3 0 
0 1 68 100 484.90 39 25.57 
0 1 8 100 465.00 42 10 
0 0 102 100 550.00 49 0 
0 0 51 100 470.00 14 0 
0 1 510 100 376.00 12 0 
0 1 13 100 480.00 34 0 
1 1 3 100 540.00 9 10 
0 0 107 100 0.00 0 0 
0 1 16 100 445.00 9 9.99 
1 1 310 99.1 0.00 0 19.99 
0 0 361 99.6 549.00 7 0 
0 1 16 100 500.00 21 9.99 
1 1 23 100 535.00 5 0 
0 1 17 100 485.00 23 10 
1 1 759 98.9 503.23 26 10.29 
1 1 3277 99.9 599.99 1 19.99 
1 1 3277 99.9 0.00 0 21.99 
1 1 3277 99.9 549.99 1 19.99 
1 1 56 98.1 600.00 37 8.4 
0 0 9 100 552.00 48 0 
0 1 4 100 550.00 13 0 
0 1 134 100 579.00 1 9 
0 1 30 100 570.00 43 15 
0 1 30 100 570.98 41 15 
1 1 1466 99.8 510.00 48 0 
0 1 331 99.2 449.99 1 0 
1 1 363 95.8 599.00 1 29.99 
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1 1 363 95.8 599.00 1 29.99 
0 0 63 100 443.00 30 12 
1 1 3 100 785.00 22 9.99 
0 1 455 100 490.79 31 0 
0 0 18 95 465.00 24 0 
0 1 76 97.6 560.00 50 20 
1 1 81 100 600.00 26 23 
0 0 35 100 700.00 56 12 
0 0 3 100 0.00 0 12 
0 1 663 100 495.00 19 13.85 
0 0 70 100 540.00 19 0 
0 0 116 98.9 570.05 14 5.95 
0 1 76 97.6 560.00 50 20 
0 1 10 100 471.00 46 4.95 
0 0 6 100 0.00 0 12.95 
1 1 833 100 620.00 1 0 
1 1 833 100 620.00 1 0 
1 1 28 100 550.00 31 10 
0 0 0 0 0.00 0 9.99 
0 0 0 0 0.00 0 9.99 
0 0 0 0 0.00 0 9.99 
0 1 170 97.8 0.00 30 0 
0 1 0 0 0.00 0 0 
1 0 26 100 551.00 36 0 
1 1 52 92.3 475.00 29 9.99 
0 0 238 99.2 425.00 3 17.34 
1 1 81 100 600.00 26 23 
1 1 51 66.7 540.00 29 0 
1 1 1046 100 649.99 1 0 
1 1 1046 100 0.00 0 0 
1 1 1046 100 649.99 1 0 
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0 1 191 100 480.00 15 15 
0 1 191 100 510.00 6 15 
1 1 671 100 499.00 1 0 
1 0 318 98.1 500.00 35 10 
1 0 476 100 530.00 46 0 
1 0 139 96.8 500.00 13 0 
0 1 671 100 455.00 13 10 
0 0 4 100 465.00 16 0 
0 0 230 100 474.00 28 13 
0 0 89 100 447.00 59 8 
0 1 191 100 510.00 37 0 
1 1 16 100 530.00 50 0 
1 1 24 100 510.00 19 60.01 
0 1 942 98.6 510.00 1 0 
0 1 815 96.4 520.00 48 19.95 
0 1 19 100 0.00 0 13.99 
1 1 10 100 575.00 38 15 
1 1 582 100 550.00 27 0 
0 0 331 100 0.00 20 14.95 
0 1 574 98.5 405.00 28 20 
0 0 264 98.5 309.99 3 19.99 
0 0 35 100 700.00 56 12 
0 0 54 100 350.00 1 11.95 
0 1 183 100 420.00 25 0 
0 1 663 100 0.00 0 13.85 
0 0 70 100 540.00 16 0 
0 0 791 99.4 425.00 35 8 
1 1 229 100 550.00 2 0 
1 1 190 100 0.00 0 11.78 
1 1 582 100 540.00 1 0 
1 1 582 100 540.00 1 0 
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1 1 582 100 540.00 1 0 
0 0 6 0 411.00 34 0 
0 0 804 99.3 0.00 0 4.85 
0 1 1 100 0.00 0 20 
1 1 3 100 441.01 19 10 
1 1 3 100 455.00 21 10 
0 0 68 91.7 450.00 1 0 
0 1 32 100 625.00 1 5 
1 1 40 97.6 0.00 0 19 
0 1 23 100 420.00 36 25 
0 1 0 560.00 12 0 
0 1 455 100 520.00 36 0 
1 1 52 92.3 540.00 38 9.99 
1 1 0 0 500.00 51 0 
1 1 0 0 640.00 53 0 
1 1 0 0 560.00 32 0 
1 1 0 0 500.00 50 0 
1 0 172 100 579.00 3 0 
0 1 0 0 408.00 42 0 
0 1 157 100 0.00 0 0 
1 0 2575 99.5 442.00 32 11.99 
0 0 2381 98.8 0.00 0 19.99 
1 1 214 97.4 404.99 2 10 
0 0 39 100 450.00 1 0 
0 1 156 100 0.00 0 0 
1 1 152 96.3 570.00 17 0 
1 1 152 96.3 540.00 12 0 
1 1 152 96.3 599.88 27 0 
1 1 26 100 530.00 35 1.5 
1 1 0 0 542.00 32 0 
1 1 23 100 550.00 1 0 
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0 1 51 100 510.00 14 10 
1 0 3 100 0.00 0 0 
0 0 81 100 500.00 4 0 
0 0 660 100 212.50 38 12 
1 0 17 100 549.00 1 0 
0 0 144 98.2 330.00 29 15 
0 0 3 80 0.00 13 2.58 
1 1 314 100 580.00 22 0 
1 1 121 100 615.00 1 0 
0 1 30 100 570.00 34 15 
0 1 30 100 540.00 27 15 
1 1 129 100 0.00 0 0 
0 1 574 98.5 419.99 1 20 
0 1 40 100 515.00 12 15 
0 0 106 100 430.00 22 10 
0 0 121 95.7 540.50 28 0 
0 1 367 97.9 549.00 1 0 
1 1 10 100 513.00 20 14.99 
1 1 362 100 0.00 0 10 
0 1 32 100 0.00 0 5 
0 1 218 98.8 595.00 1 4.8 
0 0 54 100 320.00 1 11.95 
1 1 699 100 525.00 1 0 
1 1 260 100 610.00 6 0 
0 0 259 100 510.00 6 0 
1 0 414 100 0.00 0 0 
0 0 165 100 370.00 36 25 
0 0 26 100 470.00 17 0 
0 1 68 100 529.99 45 26.47 
1 1 310 99.1 0.00 0 19.99 
0 0 30 100 445.00 18 8 
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0 0 3 100 0.00 0 0 
1 1 72 84.6 510.00 33 0 
0 1 942 98.6 499.99 1 0 
0 1 942 98.6 580.00 11 0 
0 0 162 100 535.00 33 0 
1 1 81 100 532.00 26 23 
0 0 22 100 455.00 47 0 
0 1 48 100 495.00 22 0 
0 0 162 100 535.00 33 0 
0 0 27 100 400.00 12 15 
0 0 15 100 455.00 30 0 
0 1 849 98.7 464.00 28 22.95 
0 1 510 100 304.55 3 0 
0 1 30 100 560.00 47 15 
0 1 30 100 600.00 9 15 
0 0 95 95.7 365.00 43 10 
1 1 81 100 532.00 26 23 
0 1 205 100 455.00 44 0 
1 0 17 100 589.00 1 0 
0 0 3734 99.1 0.00 0 9.6 
0 0 10 100 525.00 56 4.95 
1 0 20 100 548.98 5 0 
1 1 190 100 0.00 0 11.78 
0 0 390 99.1 0.00 0 0 
0 0 13 100 400.00 1 0 
1 1 0 0 470.00 50 0 
0 1 274 100 450.00 8 10 
1 0 420 100 520.00 52 0 
0 0 22 100 455.00 47 0 
1 0 1 66.7 375.00 28 7 
1 0 31 100 580.00 41 12 
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1 1 20 100 550.00 1 15 
0 0 150 100 530.00 20 0 
0 0 70 100 480.00 52 0 
1 0 11 100 0.00 0 9.99 
1 1 152 96.3 540.00 19 0 
1 1 364 100 470.00 1 0 
1 1 111 100 500.00 1 12 
0 0 2 100 530.00 7 0 
0 1 27 100 499.99 2 15 
1 1 713 99.3 0.00 0 20 
1 1 196 99.5 0.00 0 0 
0 1 150 100 435.00 44 15 
1 0 3734 99.1 510.00 40 9.6 
1 0 259 100 470.00 48 0 
0 0 264 98.5 449.99 8 19.99 
0 0 264 98.5 315.00 33 19.99 
1 0 77 100 510.00 10 16.44 
0 1 86 100 405.00 65 10 
1 1 59 100 520.00 1 11.55 
0 1 206 100 470.00 10 15 
0 0 138 100 395.00 43 10 
0 1 86 100 405.00 43 10 
0 0 27 100 498.00 51 0 
0 0 1146 99.7 415.00 23 7.99 
0 0 39 100 609.99 6 0 
0 0 390 99.1 0.00 0 0 
0 1 211 100 475.00 27 5 
0 1 48 100 495.00 22 0 
1 0 77 100 530.00 23 16.44 
0 0 290 99.1 510.00 28 0 
1 1 129 100 649.99 1 0 
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0 1 94 100 398.00 19 10 
1 0 345 97.7 540.00 39 0 
0 1 0 0 400.98 8 0 
0 0 75 97.5 424.99 1 0 
0 1 175 95.5 585.00 51 0 
1 0 6 100 455.00 20 10 
0 0 1 100 0.00 0 15.17 
0 1 9 100 445.00 18 0 
1 1 40 97.6 0.00 0 19 
0 0 28 100 450.00 13 11.5 
0 1 27 100 499.99 3 15 
0 0 574 98.5 429.99 1 0 
0 0 574 98.5 419.99 1 15 
0 0 574 98.5 429.99 1 0 
0 0 574 98.5 429.99 1 0 
0 1 94 100 455.00 21 0 
0 0 52 96.4 435.00 1 15 
0 0 51 100 200.00 1 15 
1 0 139 96.8 530.00 18 0 
0 0 45 100 450.00 25 10 
0 0 78 100 249.99 1 0 
0 1 370 100 314.99 4 15 
0 1 379 100 560.00 19 0 
0 1 10 100 520.00 1 0 
1 1 202 100 500.00 10 0 
1 1 379 100 550.00 28 0 
1 1 379 100 540.00 25 0 
1 1 379 100 560.00 50 0 
1 1 379 100 540.00 31 0 
0 0 34 100 405.00 35 10 
0 0 390 99.1 0.00 0 0 
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0 1 30 100 550.00 36 15 
0 0 100 100 500.00 1 15 
1 1 56 98.1 570.00 34 8.4 
0 1 149 100 450.00 6 0 
0 0 469 100 449.00 1 0 
1 1 56 98.1 565.00 53 8.4 
1 1 88 100 599.00 7 11.99 
0 0 3 100 560.00 14 9 
0 1 210 100 330.00 1 23 
0 0 88 100 415.00 49 17.65 
0 0 138 100 366.00 33 10 
0 1 87 100 455.00 27 0 
0 0 108 100 406.00 36 15 
1 1 335 100 549.00 1 0 
0 0 211 100 415.00 47 5 
0 1 83 100 610.00 24 0 
0 0 2 100 400.00 23 10 
0 0 455 100 385.00 1 0 
0 0 123 100 519.99 2 0 
0 0 195 100 405.00 26 10 
0 1 942 98.6 510.00 1 0 
0 0 140 100 430.00 38 0 
1 1 88 100 565.00 7 11.99 
1 0 111 99 0.00 0 6.95 
0 0 574 98.5 429.99 1 0 
0 0 15 100 248.50 31 10 
0 0 64 100 335.00 41 0 
0 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 
0 0 79 100 275.00 1 0 
1 1 105 100 600.00 27 0 
0 0 390 99.1 0.00 0 9.95 
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0 0 1 100 355.90 7 13 
0 0 64 100 212.55 15 0 
0 0 23 100 0.00 0 0 
0 0 16 100 412.50 13 15 
1 1 82 100 555.00 41 0 
1 1 1460 98.8 0.00 0 0 
0 0 5 100 429.50 42 5 
0 1 48 100 560.00 25 0 
0 1 153 100 455.00 37 13.99 
0 0 29 100 394.00 8 15 
1 0 14 100 520.00 47 12 
0 1 48 100 560.00 25 0 
0 0 153 100 455.00 37 13.99 
1 1 1 100 510.00 58 0 
0 0 19 100 500.00 22 0 
0 0 7 100 425.00 38 10 
1 0 11 100 491.00 43 10 
0 1 196 99.5 0.00 0 0 
0 1 455 100 576.00 55 0 
1 1 363 95.8 0.00 0 29.99 
1 1 0 0 490.00 13 10 
1 0 58 92.3 550.00 2 10 
1 0 58 92.3 550.00 6 10 
0 1 409 100 485.00 17 21 
0 1 13 100 500.00 20 0 
0 0 52 96.4 450.00 1 0 
0 0 34 100 550.00 1 4.8 
0 0 2381 98.8 501.00 36 19.99 
0 0 34 100 0.00 0 4.8 
0 1 455 100 556.00 31 0 
1 1 110 96.6 0.00 0 0 
39 
 
1 0 130 100 475.00 9 10 
0 1 10 100 530.00 38 18 
0 0 3470 99.8 425.00 1 0 
0 1 849 98.7 410.00 28 22.95 
0 0 0 0 0.00 0 29.99 
0 1 179 100 465.00 27 0 
0 0 87 98.1 205.50 18 9.95 
1 1 752 100 510.00 6 15.85 
1 0 515 100 550.00 16 22.5 
0 1 307 100 435.00 49 4.8 
1 1 297 98.4 561.00 46 0 
1 0 245 100 550.00 32 9 
1 1 121 100 619.00 1 0 
0 1 72 100 550.00 1 0 
0 1 151 100 629.99 11 0 
0 0 29 100 394.00 8 15 
0 0 13 100 0.00 0 0 
0 0 390 99.1 0.00 0 9.95 
0 0 3277 99.9 271.25 36 12.99 
1 1 72 84.6 535.00 41 0 
0 0 17 100 530.00 16 0 
1 1 14 100 550.00 1 25 
0 1 130 97.6 420.00 17 5 
1 1 52 92.3 490.01 21 9.99 
0 0 150 100 475.00 33 0 
0 1 71 100 470.00 41 0 
0 1 28 88.9 455.00 28 15 
0 1 33 100 485.00 2 0 
0 0 123 100 405.00 14 0 
0 0 53 100 453.00 28 0 
0 0 53 100 467.00 31 0 
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0 0 5 100 550.00 1 0 
0 1 16 100 560.00 21 0 
0 0 31 94.7 445.00 26 20 
0 1 16 100 478.00 49 0 
0 1 173 100 259.99 2 29.99 
0 0 0 50 446.00 51 0 
0 1 21 100 559.00 15 0 
0 1 62 95.2 530.00 6 0 
1 0 112 100 510.00 16 9.5 
1 0 112 100 510.00 18 9.5 
0 1 90 100 395.00 1 10 
0 0 24 100 410.03 25 0 
1 1 10 100 490.01 24 14.99 
0 0 134 100 400.00 1 12 
0 1 19 100 430.00 58 0 
0 1 942 98.6 510.00 1 0 
0 1 942 98.6 499.99 1 0 
0 0 830 98.3 499.00 1 8.5 
1 1 52 92.3 0.00 0 9.99 
1 1 14 100 599.00 1 0 
1 1 161 100 555.00 35 0 
1 1 362 100 530.00 5 10 
0 0 202 98.5 470.00 45 0 
0 0 202 98.5 420.00 33 0 
0 0 2381 98.8 380.00 24 19.99 
1 0 18 100 560.00 38 0 
0 0 9 100 415.00 28 15 
1 0 1494 100 540.00 28 0 
0 1 83 100 449.99 1 0 
0 1 2 100 405.00 48 12.99 
0 1 47 100 500.00 1 0 
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0 1 849 98.7 424.00 23 22.95 
0 1 4 100 457.01 63 0 
0 1 322 98.9 430.00 28 14.99 
0 0 2918 99.8 363.00 16 12.2 
0 0 49 100 0.00 0 15 
1 0 67 100 615.00 13 0 
1 1 1046 100 649.99 1 0 
0 0 151 100 450.00 27 0 
1 0 29 100 460.00 44 12.99 
0 0 311 98.8 435.00 34 0 
0 0 390 99.1 449.95 1 0 
1 0 1494 100 530.00 26 0 
0 0 19 100 425.05 9 0 
0 1 29 100 470.00 29 0 
1 1 66 100 520.00 16 12.95 
0 0 117 100 400.00 5 13 
0 1 223 100 480.00 23 5 
1 0 188 100 549.99 1 0 
0 1 71 100 0.00 0 0 
0 1 71 100 425.00 25 0 
0 0 14 100 580.00 40 0 
0 1 66 100 520.01 32 20 
0 1 102 100 500.00 29 0 
1 1 229 100 569.00 1 0 
0 1 21 100 0.00 0 5 
0 0 4 100 440.00 35 0 
1 1 13 100 599.00 1 10 
0 0 14 100 0.00 0 15.8 
0 1 2 100 440.00 11 0 
1 1 229 100 574.00 16 0 
1 1 13 100 460.00 1 0 
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0 0 625 100 380.00 8 10 
1 1 84 100 530.00 29 0 
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